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BOOK REVIEW
Determining Forces in Collective Wage Bargaining. By Harold M. Levin-
son. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966. Pp. ix, 283.
Professor Levinson prefaces Determining Forces in Collective Wage Bar-
gaining with the observation that the problem of systematically explaining the
process of wage determination, despite considerable theoretical and empirical
analysis, has "remained largely an intractable one."1 His book represents an
attempt to overcome this analytical deadlock by amassing new wage, fringe,
and bargaining data for six industries located on the west coast.
An evaluation of the success of this study in answering the question
implicit in its title will depend, in part, upon the predilection of the reader
toward an economic or a noneconomic view of collective bargaining. At the
outset, let me admit that my bias, and thus the source of most of my criti-
cisms, is toward the former interpretation. The book is not so dominated by
the author's analysis, however, that the reader cannot independently assess
the facts.
The study consists of three distinct parts: (1) a brief survey of several
contemporary appraisals of the forces influencing collective bargaining; (2)
case studies of collective bargaining in six west coast industries; and (3) an
analysis of the factors influencing collective bargaining.
The six industries studied include three in manufacturing—airframe,
lumber, and pulp and paper—and three in nonmanufacturing—longshore, off-
shore maritime, and over-the-road trucking. Working with a variety of infor-
mation obtained during fifteen months of field work, including interviews with
employers and union representatives, materials from their files, and discus-
sions with informed observers, Professor Levinson has assembled a detailed
documentary of collective bargaining in these industries.
The point of departure chosen by the author is that the outcome of
collective bargaining is influenced by three variables—economic, political, and
"pure power." The economic variables employed are the standard ones, such
as profit rates, employment, and output. The political variables are defined as
the pressures placed upon union leaders to negotiate settlements similar
enough to those obtained by competing unions to preserve its organizational
strength and the prestige of its leadership. "Pure power" variables are de-
scribed as those factors which "affect the strength and stability of the bargain-
ing institutions themselves . . . ."2 These include "primarily those that affect
the union's ability to undertake, and the employer's ability to resist, strike
action."3
As an analytical methodology, without judging the relative weights to
be assigned to the variables, I find little conceptual difficulty with the first
two types of influences. Playing the economist's advocate, however, I would
contend that the "pure power" variable contains a significant economic com-
1012
BOOK REVIEW
ponent, and that to label this as a third influence is to create a self-serving
construction with analytical implications, which may conceal significant un-
derlying causal forces in the wage-determining process? I would suggest,
therefore, that the reader view references to "power" influences as being
derived, in large part, from economic factors such as the following: the size
of strike funds (which are in turn determined by the previous strike activity
of the union and the employment experience of the union membership); earn-
ings retained by the employer; the state of the labor market; inventory
levels; savings of union members; the ability of the employer to retain
markets during a strike; and the possibility of maintaining production with
supervisory personnel or new employees. After allowing for the influence of
these factors, one might well wonder if much is added by an explanation of
the highly qualitative summary variables such as "employer cohesiveness" or
"willingness of the union membership to strike" upon which much emphasis
is placed in the descriptive material.
The six industry studies represent the major contribution of the book.
The pre-1945 collective-bargaining history of each is briefly summarized.
For the period 1945 to 1962, there are detailed descriptions of the economic
environment, the interunion jurisdictional or representational rivalries, the
personalites of the negotiators who participated in the collective bargaining,
and the outcomes of these negotiations. The approach is painstaking, and the
material is systematically developed. The detail occasionally becomes confus-
ing in its abundance, but frequent summarizations are provided for the reader
experiencing difficulty in organizing the data.
The industry studies do, however, share one common weakness. The
author, in developing materials relating to qualitative factors in bargaining,
such as cohesiveness or union rivalry, arrives at conclusions which often seem
too facile. For example, in contrasting the pattern of wage settlements nego-
tiated by the UAW at North American Aviation and those negotiated by the
IAM at Lockheed Aircraft, during a period when the two unions were coordi-
nating their bargaining strategies, the author indicates that a cost-of-living
escalator clause in the UAW contract provided fifteen cents more in wages
than the IAM agreement from 1956 to 1958. Not until 1958 did the TAM
negotiate a cost-of-living adjustment. In Douglas Aircraft, however, where
both unions were represented, the IAM contract was voluntarily reopened in
late 1956 to include the cost-of-living escalator. The author concludes that
this pattern of wages among these companies was dictated by political con-
siderations. In the Douglas case, "coercive comparisons" between the UAW
and the IAM led to the voluntary reopener, while the cooperative relationship
between the IAM and the UAW reduced the "rivalry pressures" on the IAM
and permitted the fifteen-cent cost-of-living disadvantage to persist at Lock-
heed.'
Such a statement raises many unanswered questions. Can the fifteen-cent
differential be explained by the cooperation? Is the differential per se evidence
4 Professor Levinson recognizes these economic components when describing his
"pure power" variable, but proceeds to treat "power" as a force which is sufficiently
separable from economic forces. Pp. 8-9, 18.
5 Pp. 62-63.
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that the "pressures" were not as severe as they might have been? What is
implied about the sources of such pressures which permit them to be relieved
by cooperation among union leaders? Is "rivalry" caused by leaders' per-
sonalities or by membership pressures arising from unfavorable wage compari-
sons? Why did interunion cooperation not relieve such pressures at Douglas?
In another case, when analyzing the "strength and stability" of the
Pacific Coast Association of Pulp and Paper Manufacturers, an industry bar-
gaining organization, Professor Levinson attributes these characteristics to
the size composition of the Association, the leadership position of one com-
pany (Crown Zellerbach), and a series of Association "resolutions" which
"provide protection against individual companies gradually undermining the
contracts." 6 While these factors admittedly describe the Association, they do
not indicate the nature of the sanctions which bind the Association together.
Indeed, I suspect that size composition, leadership, and formal rules would be
impotent factors if there were not a compelling community of interest among
the employers, a fear of economic reprisal against withdrawal, and a sufficient
security of markets from outside competition which made the resolutions self-
enforcing. Many of these factors are implicit in the discussion but, I believe,
deserve to be made more explicit.
These criticisms should not detract from the value of the information
presented, but are intended to provide only a note of caution to the reader.
Special commendation, for example, should be given to chapter 3, dealing
with the pacific coast lumber and pulp and paper industries, and chapter 4,
on longshore and offshore maritime. The history of the relationship among
wage patterns in industries closely related by labor and product markets or
by input-output connections, and the interplay of the wage-determining forces
in these industries, are eloquently detailed. It provides an interesting picture
of the manner in which established wage patterns may begin to diverge and
then reassemble into new wage patterns. To a student of wage behavior, such
periods of transition and change are often more illuminating than periods of
stability. For me, these were the most interesting and rewarding sections.
The concluding chapter purports to evaluate the descriptive materials
presented earlier in order to determine the relative importance of the three
types of wage-determining forces mentioned above. The evaluation is disap-
pointing. I thoroughly agree with Professor Levinson's concluding observation
that the impression which emerges from his study is of "the extraordinarily
complex nature of those factors which determine the outcome of any major
collective bargaining negotiation, a complexity that presents formidable con-
ceptual and empirical problems that will have to be dealt with before a more
complete theory of wage determination under collective bargaining can be
developed."7 However, I remain skeptical that, for purposes of explaining
and, more importantly, predicting wage behavior, Professor Levinson's ap-
proach is more effective than one which relies exclusively upon quantifiable
economic variables.
Lest I leave the impression that I regard all wage setting as being im-
mune to noneconomic forces, let me cite an example from the James' study
6 P. 93.
' P. 276.
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of the Teamsters which clearly establishes, to my satisfaction, that a non-
economic factor can be important in determining wage rates, at least in a
particular negotiation and at a particular point in time:
Once, after Hoffa had "bargained" and announced triple pay for five
holidays, I chided him, "Why not six?" The next morning at break-
fast he told his top aides that, "Ralph thinks I should have made it
six holidays and thinks I can't change." They chuckled. Two hours
later, after twenty minutes of "bargaining" with surprised em-
ployers, he demonstrated how easy it is to change the number "five"
to "six."8
It is difficult to assert, however, that noneconomic forces can continuously and
systematically be used to exploit the collective-bargaining process in favor of
one party. As the period of time and the level of aggregation at which wages
are studied are increased, it appears that, for many industries, economic forces
begin to dominate the explanation of wage behavior.° It is this distinction
between the short run and the long run which the author fails to make clear.
I concur, in general, with Professor Levinson's conclusions regarding
economic influences, including those contained in the "pure power" factor.
I must remain, however, somewhat unmoved by his generalizations which
stress the importance of the influences of noneconomic factors such as motiva-
tion, prestige, and political pressure upon the wage-determining process, es-
pecially in the long run.
In dealing with the economic determinants of wages, Professor Levinson
finds that the influence of the labor-market variables is inconclusive. This
judgment, however, is based on total employment changes and omits such fac-
tors as labor-market unemployment rates and changes in labor turnover which
may be significant. Product-market influences, on the other hand, are found to
be significant. Professor Levinson stresses that barriers to the entry of new
firms into an industry will have a positive effect upon the ability of the union
to maintain organizational strength among the strategic producers in the
industry and will therefore have an impact upon collective bargaining. This
theory of the relationship between union organizational strength and in-
dustrial concentration is quite interesting and deserves further exploration."
While the argument about the relative importance of various wage-deter-
mining forces still remains unresolved by this book, Professor Levinson has
provided provocative material for further study.
PETER B. DOERINGER
Instructor of Economics
Harvard University
James & James, Hoffa and the Teamsters: A Study of Union Power 26 (1965).
9 See Eckstein & Wilson, The Determination of Money Wages in American Industry,
76 Q.J. Econ. 379 (1962). Institutional hypotheses are included in their analysis, but
economic factors are important determinants of the institutional hypotheses.
10 See also Levinson, Unionism, Concentration, and Wage Changes: Toward a Unified
Theory, 20 Ind. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 198 (1967).
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